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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In this diversity case appellant Susan R. Lindsey 
("Lindsey"), a licensed real estate agent, appeals an order of 
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
granting summary judgment in favor of her former employer, 
appellees M. A. Zeccola & Sons, Inc. and Michael A. Zeccola 
(collectively and individually "Zeccola").  She asserts the 
district court erred in concluding the statute of frauds barred 
her claim for breach of an eighteen month employment contract. 
Lindsey also asserts the court erred in concluding the one year 
statute of limitations barred her claim for a sales commission. 
She contends a three year statute of limitations which would not 
bar her claim applies. 
 We hold the district court correctly concluded 
Delaware's statute of frauds barred Lindsey's breach of contract 
claim and we will affirm that part of its order.  We agree with 
Lindsey, however, that the district court should have applied the 
three year statute of limitations to her commission claim.  We 
will therefore reverse the part of the district court's order 
granting summary judgment to Zeccola on Lindsey's claim for a 
sales commission.0 
                     
0Lindsey also argues the district court erred in dismissing her 
claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  We hold Lindsey's arguments concerning these 
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I.  Statement of Facts and Procedural History 
 The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Lindsey, follow.  In 1989, Zeccola sought to hire a person to 
sell homes at its development in Hampton Pointe, Delaware 
("Hampton Pointe").  At the time, Lindsey worked for another 
broker on a straight commission basis but was looking for a 
position which would provide her with a steadier income. 
 Lindsey and Michael Zeccola first met at Zeccola's home 
in November of 1989.  They next met at Zeccola's Hampton Pointe 
office on November 29, 1989 and discussed benefits, salary and 
commission.  Lindsey informed Zeccola she was not willing to work 
weekends and Zeccola responded he did not expect her to do so. 
Zeccola handed Lindsey a typed document containing the terms of 
proposed employment.  The document proposed alternative terms of 
a weekly salary plus commission, or a straight commission with 
weekly draws against commission.  Lindsey told Zeccola neither 
proposal was acceptable. 
 Lindsey and Zeccola met again on December 4, 1989 at 
the Hampton Pointe office.  Zeccola handed Lindsey a one-page, 
handwritten proposal headed "calculated on 18 month's,"0 
containing the word "Susan," Lindsey's telephone number and the 
date "1/24/90" across the top.  Appendix ("App.") at 2.  Below 
                                                                  
claims lack merit.  Therefore, we will affirm the district 
court's order dismissing them. 
0The apostrophe noting the possessive case in the heading is a 
grammatical error unless it was meant to limit a missing term 
such as "salary."  As we conclude infra in Part III, it is 
ambiguous in either case. 
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this information were two columns, each describing a different 
pay option.  Lindsey testified at her deposition that Zeccola, 
when he presented the proposal to her, said "this is a contract 
for 18 months, and this is what I am willing to pay you [left 
column].  This [right column] is what you wanted, and this [left 
column] is what I am willing to pay."  Lindsey v. M. A. Zeccola & 
Sons, Inc., No. 92-283-SLR, slip op. at 2 (D. Del. May 24, 1993). 
Lindsey testified she responded that she "accepted that contract 
[the left column] for 18 months of employment at that salary and 
those terms."  Id.  Neither Lindsey nor Zeccola signed the 
proposal.  Lindsey also says they discussed weekend work and 
Zeccola understood that she was not going to work every weekend 
because "our original plan was that I was to have off every other 
weekend."  Id. at 3. 
 Lindsey began working for Zeccola on February 2, 1990. 
Lindsey testified her hours were Monday through Thursday 1:00 
p.m. to 5:00 p.m., with Fridays off and work on weekends from 
either 11:00 a.m. or 12:00 noon to either 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. 
Lindsey claims she procured buyers for a home in Hampton Pointe. 
On May 3, 1990 the buyers, Rakesh K. and Beeny Gupta 
(collectively the "Guptas") signed a sales contract, conditioned 
on their ability to obtain certain financing arrangements. 
Zeccola fired Lindsey on May 17, 1990, allegedly because Lindsey 
did not work in April on either Easter weekend or the weekend 
thereafter.  On November 28, 1990, Zeccola and the Guptas held a 
settlement meeting and the Hampton Pointe sale was closed. 
Lindsey received no commission. 
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 On May 12, 1992 Lindsey, a Pennsylvania resident, filed 
suit against Zeccola, a Delaware resident, claiming damages in 
excess of $50,000 for breach of contract, wrongful discharge and 
emotional distress.  Zeccola denied the existence of any 
employment contract beyond one for employment at-will and moved 
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) or for summary judgment pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  The district court granted Zeccola's 
motion for summary judgment as to all claims on May 24, 1993. 
Lindsey filed a timely notice of appeal on June 17, 1993. 
 
II.  Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this diversity case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993). 
We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).  We apply the 
substantive law of the forum state, Delaware.0  Clark v. Modern 
Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we 
exercise plenary review and apply the same principles the 
district court should have initially applied.  Under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(c), we ask whether there are any genuine 
issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).  We view 
                     
0Neither party argues that choice of law principles indicate any 
law other than that of the forum should apply. 
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the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draw all inferences in that party's favor.  Id.  The evidence, 
however, must be sufficient for a jury to return a verdict in 
favor of the nonmoving party; if it is merely colorable or not 
significantly probative, the court should grant summary judgment. 
Id. 
 
III.  The Statute of Frauds Issue 
 Lindsey argues that the district court erred in 
concluding her breach of contract claim was barred by Delaware's 
statute of frauds.  It provides: 
§ 2714.  Necessity of writing for contracts; 
     definition of writing; evidence. 
 
 (a)  No action shall be brought to 
charge any person upon any agreement . . . 
that is not to be performed within the space 
of one year from the making thereof . . . 
unless the contract is reduced to writing, or 
some memorandum, or notes thereof, are signed 
by the party to be charged therewith, or some 
other person thereunto by him lawfully 
authorized in writing . . . . 
 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2714(a) (1993).0 
 Lindsey argues the statute is satisfied by five written 
documents when they are considered together with the parties' 
testimony and other evidence and that her part performance brings 
this eighteen month contract within the part performance 
                     
0The statute of frauds applies to employment contracts which 
"cannot possibly be performed within one year."  Kirschling v. 
Lake Forest Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927, 930 (D. Del. 1988) 
(citation omitted).  Lindsey alleges her contract was for 
eighteen months. 
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exception to the statute.  The five documents include the two 
written proposals; Lindsey's federal employment eligibility 
verification form; a document containing copies of Lindsey's pay 
stubs and canceled pay checks; and a document containing copies 
of canceled checks drawn on Zeccola's account for health 
insurance reimbursements that were signed by him and made payable 
to Lindsey. 
 In Delaware a collection of several writings, only one 
of which is signed, may satisfy the Delaware statute of frauds. 
Abramson v. Delrose, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 440, 442 (D. Del. 1955). 
In determining whether any particular writing or writings satisfy 
the statute, Delaware relies on section 131 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts which requires that at least one of the 
writings be signed by the party to be charged and that all the 
writings taken together: 
 (a) reasonably identif[y] the subject 
matter of the contract, 
 
 (b) [are] sufficient to indicate that a 
contract with respect thereto has been made 
between the parties or offered by the signer 
to the other party, and 
 
 (c) state[] with reasonable certainty 
the essential terms of the unperformed 
promises in the contract. 
 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 131 (1981); see Kirschling v. 
Lake Forest Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927, 931 (D. Del. 1988). 
 It is undisputed that Zeccola's signature appears on 
some of the five documents.  The dispute is over the other three 
requirements of Restatement section 131.  After the district 
9 
court reviewed all the documents, it held that none of them, 
singly or together, sufficiently identified the subject matter, 
duration, job description or hours of employment with the 
precision needed to satisfy the statute: 
 Plaintiff's first unsigned document 
. . . contains two different salary 
proposals.  Since plaintiff did not accept 
either of these proposals, it cannot be 
considered as identifying the subject matter 
of the contract.  Plaintiff's second unsigned 
document . . . also sets forth two salary 
proposals.  Although plaintiff eventually 
accepted one of the two proposals on this 
page, the document standing alone is 
deficient since 1) defendant did not sign it 
and 2) it fails to set forth any specific 
terms of employment.  Moreover, the notation 
"calculated on 18 month's" does not 
conclusively demonstrate an offer for an 18-
month contract. 
 
 Plaintiff's employment verification form 
. . . payroll records . . . and canceled 
checks for health insurance . . . all fail to 
provide job description, hours or other terms 
of employment.  Moreover, none of these three 
documents contain any internal or direct 
connection  with each other or with the first 
two documents. 
 
 
Lindsey, slip op. at 7. 
 Lindsey argues that the district court erred in making 
these determinations.  She relies heavily on section 132 of the 
Restatement.  It states "[t]he memorandum may consist of several 
writings if one of the writings is signed and the writings in the 
circumstances clearly indicate that they relate to the same 
transaction."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132 (1981). 
Lindsey stresses illustration five.  It states: 
10 
A agrees orally to employ B for two years. An 
unsigned memorandum of the contract, stating 
its terms, is prepared at A's direction.  
Later B begins work and payroll cards are 
made and initialed by A which state some of 
the terms but not the duration of the 
employment.  If it is clear that the unsigned 
memorandum and the payroll cards refer to the 
same agreement, they may be read together as 
a sufficient memorandum to charge A. 
 
 
Id. at § 132 cmt. c, illus. 5.  This illustration is drawn from 
Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 
1952).  Id. at § 132 reporter's note.  In Crabtree the documents 
at issue included two payroll cards signed by the defendant's 
agents.  They contained the parties' names, plaintiff's position 
and his salary.  Crabtree, 110 N.E.2d at 553.  Significantly, the 
second payroll card, prepared by defendant's comptroller at 
plaintiff's insistence that the original agreement entitled him 
to a pay raise, noted "'Salary increase per contractual 
arrangements with [the defendant.]'"  Id. at 555.  The court 
found this statement "certainly constitutes a reference of sorts 
to a more comprehensive 'arrangement . . . .'"  Id. at 555.  It 
therefore considered parol evidence to show defendant's consent 
to the terms of the unsigned office memorandum.  Id.  Reasoning 
that a sufficient connection between writings is established by a 
clear reference in them to the same subject matter or 
transaction, the court found all three documents at issue 
"refer[red] on their face to the same transaction" because all of 
the information contained in the office memorandum was entirely 
consistent with the detailed information in the payroll cards, so 
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that "it is hardly possible that such detailed information could 
refer to another or a different agreement."  Id. at 554-55. 
 In Crabtree the term of employment at issue was the 
length of the contract.  Id. at 555.  The court decided the 
unsigned memorandum's notation "two years to make good" 
designated the term of employment.  Id.  The court concluded this 
notation could not be given meaning unless it was read as a 
reference to the duration of employment.  To the extent the 
statement was ambiguous, the New York court concluded that it 
could consider parol evidence to interpret its meaning.  Id.  The 
Crabtree court reasoned "[w]hat purpose, other than to denote the 
length of the contract term, such a notation could have, is hard 
to imagine."  Id.  Unless the notation were meaningless, the 
court had to relate it to the length of the employment contract. 
Id.  After considering the wage scale, the plaintiff's periodic 
pay increases, the parties' relationship, the course of 
negotiations and the plaintiff's insistence upon employment 
security, the court found "the purpose of the phrase . . . was to 
grant plaintiff the tenure he desired."  Id. 
 We, like the district court, believe that Crabtree is 
distinguishable.  In Crabtree each of the two signed payroll 
cards contained all but one of the essential terms of the 
employment contract and the terms embodied in the payroll cards 
exactly matched the terms in the unsigned office memorandum.0 We 
do not have such specific and unequivocal evidence here.  The 
                     
0This is also true of the facts in illustration five to section 
132 of the Restatement. 
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signed documents we have are a Department of Justice Employment 
Eligibility Form I-9 ("Form I-9"), canceled payroll checks and 
canceled health insurance reimbursement checks.  They do not 
describe Lindsey's job or her work hours, and none of them 
"clearly indicate that they relate to the same transaction." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132.  Form I-9 is dated 
February 6, 1990 and is signed by Lindsey and Robert Cook, 
Zeccola's bookkeeper.  It provides no employment terms but simply 
verifies Lindsey's eligibility to work in the United States.  It 
contains no reference to any of the other documents and does not 
even show that Lindsey was employed by Zeccola. 
 The weekly payroll checks starting February 8, 1990 and 
ending May 17, 1990 are signed by Michael or Lawrence Zeccola and 
show Lindsey received a net pay of $481.84 per week.  The 
corresponding pay stubs show a weekly gross pay of $647.00. 
Lindsey's weekly gross or net pay, multiplied by the seventy-
eight weeks that make up an eighteen month term, does not match 
any of the three salary figures Zeccola offered her in the two 
written proposals.0  The pay checks and stubs show that Lindsey 
worked for Zeccola from February to May 1990 but they do not show 
her position, hours or term of employment.0 
                     
0The documents at issue purportedly offer salaries of $31,200.00, 
$50,400.00 and $52,500.00.  Lindsey's weekly net pay of $481.84 
multiplied by seventy-eight weeks equals $37,583.52. Her gross 
pay of $647.00 multiplied by seventy-eight weeks equals 
$50,466.00.  While some of the numbers are close, neither 
Lindsey's gross pay nor her net weekly pay match any of the 
proposed salaries Zeccola offered her. 
0One of the pay stubs appears to show the number "40.00" under 
the area marked "Date."  This number could relate to forty hours 
per week, but the reproduction is poor and we are unable to tell 
13 
 The two checks Michael Zeccola made payable to Lindsey 
to reimburse health insurance premiums which Lindsey had advanced 
pose the same problem as the payroll checks.  Lindsey says they 
show the parties' performance was in accord with the provision 
for health insurance in the second written proposal Zeccola 
offered her, but the amounts of these checks, $886.40 and 
$289.26, are not shown to have any relation to the $9,000.00 
figure opposite the notation "insurance."  App. at 2.  Neither 
the checks nor the insurance premium notices show Lindsey's 
position, hours, salary or duration of employment. 
 Accordingly, Lindsey's argument that these checks, read 
together with the two written proposals, disclose all the 
essential terms of her contract fails.  They do not show Lindsey 
had a position whose hours, fringes, or salary coincided with any 
of Zeccola's offers.  They do not help us tell which of the three 
proposals memorializes the essential terms of the employment 
contract the parties finally agreed upon. 
 Lindsey argues, however, that the only real dispute in 
this case concerns the length of the employment contract and that 
the eighteen month term is evidenced in writing by the statement 
"calculated on 18 month's" which heads both columns of the second 
proposal.  App. at 2.  Unless this statement clearly and 
explicitly identifies the length of employment as eighteen 
months, Delaware's presumption in favor of employment at-will 
                                                                  
what the "40.00" represents.  This notation on the stubs does not 
correspond to her testimony that she worked approximately 34-36 
hours per week.  Even if it could be interpreted to indicate her 
hours per week, our conclusion would not be changed. 
14 
comes into play to defeat Lindsey's claim.  "Delaware Courts will 
not hold an employment relationship to be anything but at-will 
absent clear and explicit terms providing otherwise."  Mann v. 
Cargill Poultry, Inc., No. 88C-AU37, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 225, 
at *22 (June 13, 1990), aff'd, 584 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1990); see 
Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 102 (Del. 1992) 
("[Delaware] law provides a heavy presumption that a contract for 
employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-will in 
nature, with duration indefinite.") (citation omitted). 
 With this presumption in mind, we consider the 
statement "calculated on 18 month's."  We note it is underlined 
and appears near the top of the page; directly beneath it are two 
columns, one beginning "salary (2,800 per mo) 50,400" and the 
other beginning "Susan," and underneath that "(2,916 per mo) 
52,500."  App. at 2.  Zeccola asserts that the statement merely 
explains how the calculations of earnings were done.  Lindsey 
admitted that the eighteen month period involved in the 
calculations was based on the time the parties estimated that it 
would take to sell-out the Hampton Pointe project.  We believe 
the calculations could likewise imply either that the contract 
was for eighteen months, as Lindsey argues, or, as Zeccola 
contends, that the parties were using the time it ultimately 
would take to sell out the Hampton Pointe project in order to 
predict total wages during a sell-out phase whose future duration 
was not fixed or known.  Zeccola's interpretation of the proposal 
as no more than a calculation based on the estimated period of 
the sell-out phase is supported by the proposal's estimate that 
15 
Lindsey would also earn commissions from the sale of "18 homes." 
Id.  At best, the statement "calculated on 18 month's" could mean 
either that the salary was calculated based on an estimated, but 
yet unknown, eighteen month sell-out phase or that it is an offer 
of employment for eighteen months.0  Thus, it is ambiguous and we 
believe such ambiguity in the written description of the parties' 
agreement on a term is fatal to Lindsey's case because of 
Delaware's "heavy presumption" in favor of employment at-will. 
 To establish an agreed upon eighteen month term of 
employment, Lindsey is wholly dependent on an ambiguous written 
statement whose interpretation is in turn dependent on the 
resolution of a conflict in oral testimony.  In Delaware all the 
provisions of an employment contract must be clearly expressed in 
writing to create an employment agreement that is not one for 
employment at-will.  Crabtree was decided under New York law and 
it is not controlling because Delaware's general adherence to 
Restatement principles is modified by a strong presumption in 
favor of employment at-will which affects Lindsey's case.  We do 
not believe the notation "calculated on 18 month's" refers to the 
length of Lindsey's employment with the clarity we believe is 
needed to avoid Delaware's presumption in favor of construing 
employment contracts as contracts for employment at-will. 
 Lindsey also argues that partial performance of her 
contract with Zeccola brings it within the statute of frauds' 
                     
0There is no evidence suggesting that Lindsey would continue to 
be employed by Zeccola after all the Hampton Pointe homes were 
sold. 
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exception for contracts evidenced by part performance.  In 
rejecting Lindsey's part performance argument the district court 
distinguished Quillen v. Sayers, 482 A.2d 744 (Del. 1984). 
Lindsey argues that the district court erred in drawing that 
distinction.  In Quillen the Delaware Supreme Court recognized "a 
well settled general exception to . . . the statute of frauds 
[which] exists when there is evidence of actual part performance 
of an oral agreement" and applied the exception to an oral 
agreement concerning a mortgage foreclosure.  Id. at 747 
(citations omitted).  The district court distinguished Quillen 
because Quillen enforced an oral agreement between a buyer and 
seller of land.  It concluded that the statute of frauds' 
exception for part performance of contracts does not extend to 
employment contracts.  Lindsey, slip op. at 9 (citing Hull v. 
Brandywine Fibre Prods. Co., 121 F. Supp. 108, 114 (D. Del. 
1954)) ("It is . . . uncontroverted that partial performance of 
services under an oral contract not to be performed within a year 
does not remove the contract from the operation of the Statute of 
Frauds so as to affect the portion of services not performed."). 
 In Hull the plaintiff alleged his former employer 
breached an oral employment agreement for a five year term by 
terminating plaintiff after three years.  Plaintiff argued the 
statute of frauds did not apply because plaintiff had partially 
performed the contract when he worked for three of the five 
years.  Hull, 121 F. Supp. at 114.  The argument rejected in Hull 
illustrates the difficulty of applying the partial performance 
exception to determine whether an employment contract falls 
17 
within the statute of frauds.  "'The act relied on as part 
performance should be such as would not have been done 
independent of [the] contract or agreement . . . because as you 
are from the act performed to infer a contract, it must therefore 
be an act of that description, which will not admit any other 
inference.'"  Durand v. Snedeker, 177 A.2d 649, 653 (Del. Ch. 
1962) (quoting Houston v. Townsend, 1 Del. Ch. 416 (1833), aff'd, 
1 Harr. 532 (1835)).  When the duration of an employment contract 
is not specified in writing, the partial performance exception 
assumes the fact at issue and allows any employee who claims an 
oral employment contract for a term in excess of one year to 
avoid the statute of frauds without written proof of the 
contract's duration.  This is precisely what the statute of 
frauds' provision requiring a writing before employment contracts 
in excess of one year will be enforced is intended to prevent: 
[T]o allow the fact that an employee worked 
and was paid for part of that year to act as 
such a bar [to application of the statute of 
frauds] would make the relevant provision of 
the statute of frauds totally meaningless. 
Any contract where the employee had started 
work and received a paycheck would be 
protected from the application of the 
statute. . . .  A check stub or even a signed 
paycheck indicates nothing except what a 
particular employee has been paid for a 
particular period.  It does not act as a 
contract to pay the employee the same amount 
for even the next pay period, much less for 
an entire year. . . . 
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Lessman v. Universal Spray Applications, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 679, 
681 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting Mapes v. Kalva Corp., 386 N.E.2d 
148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)). 
 Lindsey, in arguing that the district court should not 
have distinguished Quillen, refers us to other Delaware cases 
applying the partial performance exception to disputes between 
buyers and sellers of real estate that do not involve their 
contracts of sale.  She cites Nepa v. Marta, 348 A.2d 182, 185 
(Del. 1975).  In Nepa the Delaware Supreme Court considered 
whether a real estate broker was entitled to a sales commission 
and rejected the defendant's statute of frauds defense by 
applying the statute's exception for partial performance and 
alternately relying on a determination that "the terms of any 
such agreement could be performed within a year."  Nepa, 348 A.2d 
at 185.  Nepa concerns contracts to pay a real estate broker a 
commission.  It does not concern Delaware's statute of frauds 
relating to employment contracts. 
 Lindsey also relies on John Julian Const. Co. v. 
Monarch Builders, Inc., 306 A.2d 29 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd 
on other grounds, 324 A.2d 208 (Del. 1974).  It too did not deal 
with the statute of frauds covering employment contracts.  In 
Monarch a judgment creditor sought payment from stockholders who 
had succeeded to the assets of a dissolved debtor corporation. 
The Delaware Superior Court held the statute of frauds did not 
prevent the plaintiff from seeking payment on the stockholders' 
oral promise that they would assume the debtor's liabilities, 
because "it clearly appears that the assumption of liability--if 
19 
it in fact included the liability to [the plaintiff]--has been 
partially performed."  Id. at 34. 
 Delaware does not apply the partial performance 
exception to employment contracts with a fixed duration of over 
one year.  Enforcement of oral service contracts for a specified 
period exceeding one year is precluded by the statute of frauds, 
even if it is possible to perform them within one year.  See 
Guyer v. Haveg Corp., 205 A.2d 176, 181 (Del Super. Ct. 1964) 
(citing Hull), aff'd, 211 A.2d ___ (Del. 1965).  Lindsey's 
argument that her partial performance permits oral proof an 
eighteen month contract of employment despite the statute of 
frauds fails. 
 Moreover, even if the partial performance exception 
were to apply to oral contracts of employment, Lindsey's argument 
would still founder against Delaware's already discussed heavy 
presumption in favor of employment at-will.  As we have 
demonstrated, that presumption requires Lindsey to present clear 
and convincing evidence of all the essential terms of the 
eighteen month employment contract she is trying to enforce.  See 
Durand, 177 A.2d at 652.  Both state and federal courts applying 
Delaware law continue to follow Hull and so will we.  See, e.g., 
Behr Salyard & Partners, L.P. v. Leach, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9584, *32 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1992) (no partial performance 
exception to statute of limitations in case involving purported 
ten-year contract to form leveraged buyout fund under Hull).  We 
reject Lindsey's arguments and will affirm the part of the 
20 
district court's order granting summary judgment against her on 
her claim that Zeccola breached her employment contract.0 
 
                     
0Lindsey argues Zeccola admitted that a contract existed in 
depositions and in the course of their negotiations over her 
employment.  She contends these admissions, coupled with the 
terms of employment shown by the documents she produced, are an 
adequate substitute for the written memorandum required by the 
statute of frauds.  This argument is made for the first time on 
appeal.  Therefore, we will not address it at this time.  Frank 
v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990).  Moreover, 
Lindsey gives no citations to the record showing the alleged 
admission(s).  Zeccola denies he made them. 
21 
IV.  The Statute of Limitations Issue 
 Lindsey also claims a sales commission from Zeccola for 
a home she arranged to sell while working for him.0  The district 
court also entered summary judgment against her on this claim, 
concluding it was barred by a one year statute of limitations.  
Lindsey contends the district court should have applied a three 
year statute of limitations.  We agree with Lindsey. 
 The relevant three year statute of limitations 
provides, in relevant part: 
§ 8106.  Actions subject to 3 year 
      limitation. 
 
 No action . . . based on a promise . . . 
shall be brought after the expiration of 3 
years from the accruing of the cause of such 
action . . . . 
 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106 (1975).  The relevant one-year 
statute of limitations provides: 
§ 8111.  Work, labor or personal services. 
 
 No action for recovery upon a claim for 
wages, salary, or overtime for work, labor or 
personal services performed, or for damages 
(actual, compensatory or punitive, liquidated 
or otherwise), or for interest or penalties 
resulting from the failure to pay any such 
claim, or for any other benefits arising from 
such work, labor or personal services 
performed or in connection with any such 
                     
0Although the remaining claim is less than $50,000, the district 
court retains diversity jurisdiction.  When diversity exists at 
the time the case is filed, it is not affected by the dismissal 
of one of the claims even though the amount recoverable on the 
remaining claim is less than the required $50,000. Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. T & D Cottage Auto Parts & Serv., Inc., 705 
F.2d 685, 687 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 
280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959)). 
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action, shall be brought after the expiration 
of one year from the accruing of the cause of 
action on which such action is based. 
 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8111 (1975). 
  In concluding that the one year statute of limitations 
applied, the district court stated, "[t]he critical date to focus 
upon is the date when the work was performed, not the date when 
plaintiff could be paid."  Lindsey, slip op. at 12.  The court 
reasoned Lindsey completed her work on May 3, 1990 when she sold 
the home and her claim was time-barred under section 8111 because 
approximately two years had passed before she filed suit.  We 
think the court erred. 
 The district court relied principally on dicta in Brown 
v. Colonial Chevrolet Co., 249 A.2d 439, 441 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1968): 
 The one-year statute applies to claims 
based on work or services that have been 
completed, even though the work may have 
originally been undertaken on the strength of 
a promise.  Since the services have been 
completed, the action is based upon the 
service performed rather than on the original 
promise.  The three-year statute applies to 
claims based on work or services not yet 
completed as to which a promise has been 
made.  Since the work remains uncompleted, an 
action with respect to such work is 
necessarily based upon the underlying 
promise. 
 
 
In Brown, however, the Delaware Superior Court held that the 
three year statute of limitations applied.  Brown had sought a 
promised year-end bonus for work which had not yet been performed 
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because he was terminated before the end of the year.  The court 
reasoned "[t]he suit here is for what would have been earned had 
the employment continued rather than for something already 
earned."  Id. 
 In Delaware "the general rule is that a broker may 
recover a commission only when he is the procuring cause of a 
consummated transaction."  B-H, Inc. v.  "Industrial America," 
Inc., 253 A.2d 209, 213 (Del. 1969); see also Nepa, 348 A.2d at 
184.  A broker is not entitled to a commission until the sale 
actually takes place.  A.I.C. Ltd. v. Mapco Petroleum Inc., 711 
F. Supp. 1230, 1242 (D. Del. 1989), aff'd without opinion, 888 
F.2d 1378 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Section 8106 applies to actions based on a promise. 
Zeccola allegedly promised to pay Lindsey a commission for any 
home that she sold.  It was not certain if or when Lindsey would 
be paid because the May 3, 1990 sale agreement was contingent 
upon the Guptas' ability to obtain financing.  Lindsey was fired 
before the sale was finalized.  Delaware law did not entitle her 
to a commission until the settlement took place.  Her right to 
payment did not accrue until after her employment was terminated. 
A real estate broker's duties in connection with a sale do not 
end with the signing of the sales agreement, but often continue 
until, and sometimes after, settlement. 
 We believe Delaware case law supports application of 
the three year statute of limitations to Lindsey's claim for a 
commission.  In Nepa the Delaware Supreme Court applied the three 
year statute of limitations to an action for a broker's 
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commission.  Nepa, 348 A.2d at 184.  Zeccola's attempt to 
distinguish Nepa on the ground that it involved an independent 
broker rather than an employee does not persuade us.  Lindsey is 
not suing for back wages.  She, like the broker in Nepa, is suing 
for a commission.  Her receipt of a weekly salary is not 
dispositive on the issue of which statute of limitations applies 
to her demand that her employer perform its promise to pay her 
commission on sales she procured after the sales were later 
consummated.  If it were, we would have to treat Lindsey's right 
to the commission she was promised as a part of her weekly wage. 
We do not think it was. 
 As the district court recognized in an earlier case, 
there may sometimes be an overlap between the two statutes: 
There is seeming overlapping of [sections 
8106 and 8111] because nearly every claim for 
wages is based upon an underlying promise, 
express or implied, to pay the wages.  The 
two sections have been reconciled by the 
Supreme Court of Delaware in Goldman v. 
Braunstein's, 240 A.2d 577 (Del. Supr. 1968). 
There the court distinguished between an 
action for wages for services already 
performed to which section 8111 is relevant, 
and an action based on a contract for its 
breach prior to performance for which section 
8106 is controlling.  This distinction 
between the coverage of sections 8106 and 
8111 is clearly explained by Judge Stiftel in 
Brown v. Colonial Chevrolet, 249 A.2d 439, 
441 (Del. Super. 1968).  
 
 
Wilmington Housing Auth. v. Rocky Marciano Constr. Co., 407 
F. Supp. 228, 232 (D. Del. 1976).  The Delaware Supreme Court has 
concluded that any doubt as to which statute of limitations 
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applies should be resolved in favor of the longer period.  Sonne 
v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 196 (Del. 1973).  Thus, we believe 
Delaware case law also indicates, on the record now before us, 
that the three year statute should be applied to Lindsey's claim 
for a commission. 
 Brown itself is consistent with the Delaware Supreme 
Court's conclusion that section 8111 applies "to claims arising 
out of services [already] performed," while section 8106 applies 
to claims arising or ripening after the employment ended. Goldman 
v. Braunstein's, Inc., 240 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1968) (suit for 
breach of employment contract for damages for future services 
subject to three year statute of limitations); see also Advocat 
v. Nexus Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 328, 334 (D. Del. 1980) 
(three year statute of limitations applied to action for fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation regarding alleged promises made 
by employer for future pension benefits).  Applying the three 
year statute of limitations, the court in Goldman reasoned "any 
recoverable loss . . . arose upon or after termination of the 
employer-employee relationship."  Goldman, 240 A.2d at 578. Both 
Goldman and Advocat involved an employer/employee relationship.  
Nevertheless, because their claims were for promises of future 
payments, they fell within section 8106 rather than 8111. 
 Still other cases on future payments consistently hold 
that section 8106 applies to actions seeking payment for services 
by a licensed broker, attorney or other independent contractor. 
Compare Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 579 F. Supp. 690, 
702 (D. Del. 1984) (attorneys fees), aff'd without opinion, 746 
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F.2d 1466 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Nepa, 348 A.2d at 184 (applying 
three year statute of limitations in action seeking broker's 
commission) with Sorensen v. The Overland Corp., 142 F. Supp. 
354, 360 (D. Del. 1956) (right to indemnity was benefit of 
employment as officer or director of corporation, therefore one 
year statute applied), aff'd, 242 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1957).0 
 Considering the Delaware Supreme Court's instruction 
that courts sitting in that state should apply the longest 
statute of limitations in case of doubt, we think Lindsey's 
claim, like those of independent contractors who are normally 
paid after their services are rendered, falls under section 8106 
rather than section 8111.  Accordingly, we hold Lindsey's 
commission claim is not time-barred and we will reverse the part 
of the district court's order granting summary judgment against 
Lindsey's claim for a sales commission and remand for further 
proceedings.0 
                     
0We are not unmindful of the district court's statement in Aero 
Serv. Corp. v. E. S. Gordy, 109 A.2d 393, 394 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1954) that "[t]he very language of [section 8111] demonstrates 
that it has reference to the claims of servants, or members of 
the laboring classes and salaried employees," as opposed to 
independent contractors whose fees normally do not arise a week 
at a time but rather when their work is completed. Id. (applying 
three year statute of limitation to action for payment of 
services of independent contractor).  We do not believe, however, 
the distinction between a promise to pay an independent 
contractor for services and a promise to pay an employee a 
commission in addition to the employee's regularly accruing wages 
is controlling. 
0Lindsey also argues section 8111 is tolled because Zeccola 
actively concealed her entitlement to a commission.  This 
argument is also presented for the first time on appeal.  In any 
event, we need not consider it because of our conclusion that the 
three year statute of limitation applies and Lindsey's claim for 
a commission was therefore timely filed. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the part of the district court's order 
that granted summary judgment to Zeccola on Lindsey's claims for 
breach of an eighteen month employment contract, wrongful 
discharge and emotional distress.  We will reverse that part of 
the district court's order granting Zeccola summary judgment on 
Lindsey's claim for a sales commission and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Susan R. Lindsey v. M.A. Zeccola & Sons, Incorporated, a Delaware 
Corporation; M.A. Zeccola 
No. 93-7426 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 I join in Part IV of the opinion of the court. However, 
I dissent from Part III for two reasons.  First, I believe that 
the majority has construed the requirements of Delaware's statute 
of frauds much too rigorously; a memorandum need not be as 
complete, precise and detailed as the majority suggests to 
satisfy the statute.  Second, the majority has compounded this 
error by conflating with the statute of frauds Delaware's strict 
jurisprudence on employment-at-will unnecessarily raising the 
barrier to suit even higher.  
 I agree with appellants that the statute of frauds is 
fully satisfied here by the contract proposal written in 
Zeccola's longhand and by the other written documents.  All that 
the statute of frauds requires is that the writings reasonably 
identify the subject matter of the contract.  Restatement Second 
of Contracts, § 131(a) (1981) (quoted by majority typescript at 
7-8).  The writing need not set out all the details of the 
contract; only the "essential terms" of unperformed promises must 
be stated.  Restatement (Second), § 131(c) (quoted by majority, 
typescript at 7-8).  Exhibit "B2," written in Zeccola's own hand, 
sets out all the unperformed promises of the defendants: an 18-
month term of employment, a salary of roughly $647.00 per week, 
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health insurance, and the payment of commissions.0  Although 
Exhibit B2 was not signed by Zeccola, signed payroll cards, as in 
the Restatement example, see majority typescript at 9, referred 
to the same agreement as Exhibit B2, evidenced by the fact that 
they contained essentially the same terms.0  Thus, the signatures 
on the payroll cards apply to Exhibit B2 which contained the 
essential 18 month term of employment. 
 In short, the purpose of the statute of frauds is to 
require objective evidence of a contract in order to prevent and 
avoid fraud so that parties and witnesses cannot just make up 
claims out of whole cloth.  See Quillen v. Sayers, 482 A.2d 744, 
747 (Del. Supr. 1984).  The statutory purpose was satisfied here. 
The statute does not require a comprehensive memorial.  The 
remaining details may be fleshed out (and would have been here) 
by the testimony and by documents other than those signed by the 
"party sought to be charged."  Only at that point does Delaware's 
presumption in favor of employment at will become relevant in 
evaluating whether, based on all of the evidence, defendant 
breached the agreement. 
                     
0The law does not require writings on points not in dispute. 
Restatement (Second), § 131(c).   
0The differences in pay between the payroll cards and exhibit B2, 
see majority opinion at 11-12, were so insignificant that they do 
not cast doubt on the conclusion that the writings referred to 
the same agreement. 
